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Thesis Summary:




Informally, steganography refers to the practice of hiding secret messages in communications
over a public channel so that an eavesdropper (who listens to all communications) cannot
even tell that a secret message is being sent. In contrast to the active literature proposing
new concrete steganographic protocols and analysing flaws in existing protocols, there has
been very little work on formalizing steganographic notions of security, and none giving
complete, rigorous proofs of security in a satisfying model.
This thesis initiates the study of steganography from a cryptographic point of view. We
give a precise model of a communication channel and a rigorous definition of steganographic
security, and prove that relative to a channel oracle, secure steganography exists if and
only if one-way functions exist. We give tightly matching upper and lower bounds on the
maximum rate of any secure stegosystem. We introduce the concept of steganographic key
exchange and public-key steganography, and show that provably secure protocols for these
objectives exist under a variety of standard number-theoretic assumptions. We consider
several notions of active attacks against steganography, show how to achieve each under
standard assumptions, and consider the relationships between these notions. Finally, we
extend the concept of steganograpy as covert communication to include the more general
concept of covert computation.
1 Introduction
This dissertation focuses on the problem of steganography: how can two communicating
entities send secret messages over a public channel so that a third party cannot detect the
presence of the secret messages? Notice how the goal of steganography is different from
classical encryption, which seeks to conceal the content of secret messages: steganography is
about hiding the very existence of the secret messages.
Steganographic “protocols” have a long and intriguing history that goes back to antiquity.
There are stories of secret messages written in invisible ink or hidden in love letters (the
first character of each sentence can be used to spell a secret, for instance). More recently,
steganography was used by prisoners, spies and soldiers during World War II because mail
was carefully inspected by both the Allied and Axis governments at the time [37]. Postal
censors crossed out anything that looked like sensitive information (e.g. long strings of
digits), and they prosecuted individuals whose mail seemed suspicious. In many cases,
censors even randomly deleted innocent-looking sentences or entire paragraphs in order to
prevent secret messages from being delivered. More recently there has been a great deal
of interest in digital steganography, that is, in hiding secret messages in communications
between computers.
The recent interest in digital steganography is fueled by the increased amount of com-
munication which is mediated by computers and by the numerous potential commercial
applications: hidden information could potentially be used to detect or limit the unautho-
rized propagation of the innocent-looking “carrier” data. Because of this, there have been
numerous proposals for protocols to hide data in channels containing pictures [36, 39], video
[39, 41, 58], audio [31, 47], and even typeset text [12]. Many of these protocols are extremely
clever and rely heavily on domain-specific properties of these channels. On the other hand,
the literature on steganography also contains many clever attacks which detect the use of
such protocols. In addition, there is no clear consensus in the literature about what it
should mean for a stegosystem to be secure; this ambiguity makes it unclear whether it is
even possible to have a secure protocol for steganography.
The main goal of this thesis is to rigorously investigate the open question: “under what
conditions do secure protocols for steganography exist?” We will give rigorous cryptographic
definitions of steganographic security in multiple settings against several different types of
adversary, and we will demonstrate necessary and sufficient conditions for security in each
setting, by exhibiting protocols which are secure under these conditions.
1
2 Cryptography and Provable Security
The rigorous study of provably secure cryptography was initiated by Shannon [55], who
introduced an information-theoretic definition of security: a cryptosystem is secure if an
adversary who sees the ciphertext - the scrambled message sent by a cryptosystem - receives
no additional information about the plaintext - the unscrambled content. Unfortunately,
Shannon also proved that any cryptosystem which is perfectly secure requires that if a sender
wishes to transmit N bits of plaintext data, the sender and the receiver must share at least
N bits of random, secret data - the key. This limitation means that only parties who already
possess secure channels (for the exchange of secret keys) can have secure communications.
To address these limitations, researchers introduced a theory of security against compu-
tationally limited adversaries: a cryptosystem is computationally secure if an adversary who
sees the ciphertext cannot compute (in, e.g. polynomial time) any additional information
about the plaintext than he could without the ciphertext[30]. Potentially, a cryptosystem
which could be proven secure in this way would allow two parties who initially share a very
small number of secret bits (in the case of public-key cryptography, zero) to subsequently
transmit an essentially unbounded number of message bits securely.
Proving that a system is secure in the computational sense has unfortunately proved to
be an enormous challenge: doing so would resolve, in the negative, the open question of
whether P = NP . Thus the cryptographic theory community has borrowed a tool from
complexity theory: reductions. To prove a cryptosystem secure, one starts with a computa-
tional problem which is presumed to be intractible, and a model of how an adversary may
attack a cryptosystem, and proves via reduction that computing any additional information
from a ciphertext is equivalent to solving the computational problem. Since the computa-
tional problem is assumed to be intractible, a computationally limited adversary capable of
breaking the cryptosystem would be a contradiction and thus should not exist. In general,
computationally secure cryptosystems have been shown to exist if and only if “one-way func-
tions,” which are easy to compute but computationally hard to invert, exist. Furthermore,
it has been shown that the difficulty of a wide number of well-investigated number-theoretic
problems would imply the existence of one-way functions, for example the problem of com-
puting the factors of a product of two large primes [13], or computing discrete logarithms in
a finite field[14].
Subsequent to these breakthrough ideas [30, 13], cryptographers have investigated a wide
variety of different ways in which an adversary may attack a cryptosystem. For example, he
may be allowed to make up a plaintext message and ask to see its corresponding ciphertext,
(called a chosen-plaintext attack), or even to make up a ciphertext and ask to see what the
corresponding plaintext is (called a chosen-ciphertext attack [46, 49]). Or the adversary may
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have a different goal entirely [22, 8, 38] - for example, to modify a ciphertext so that if it
previously said “Attack” it now reads as “Retreat” and vice-versa. We will draw on this
practice to consider the security of a steganographic protocol under several different kinds
of attack.
3 Previous work on theory of steganography
The scientific study of steganography in the open literature began in 1983 when Simmons [56]
stated the problem in terms of communication in a prison. In his formulation, two inmates,
Alice and Bob, are trying to hatch an escape plan. The only way they can communicate
with each other is through a public channel, which is carefully monitored by the warden of
the prison, Ward. If Ward detects any encrypted messages or codes, he will throw both Alice
and Bob into solitary confinement. The problem of steganography is, then: how can Alice
and Bob cook up an escape plan by communicating over the public channel in such a way
that Ward doesn’t suspect anything “unusual” is going on.
Anderson and Petitcolas [6] posed many of the open problems resolved in this thesis. In
particular, they pointed out that it was unclear how to prove the security of a steganographic
protocol, and gave an example which is similar to the protocol we present in Chapter 3. They
also asked whether it would be possible to have steganography without a secret key, which
we address in Chapter 4. Finally, they point out that while it is easy to give a loose upper
bound on the rate at which hidden bits can be embedded in innocent objects, there was no
known lower bound.
Since the paper of Anderson and Petitcolas, several works [16, 42, 54, 62] have addressed
information-theoretic definitions of steganography. Cachin’s work [16, 17] formulates the
problem as that of designing an encoding function so that the relative entropy between ste-
gotexts, which encode hidden information, and independent, identically distributed samples
from some innocent-looking covertext probability distribution, is small. He gives a construc-
tion similar to one we describe, but concludes that it is computationally intractible; and
another construction which is provably secure but relies critically on the assumption that
all orderings of covertexts are equally likely. Cachin also points out several flaws in other
published information-theoretic formulations of steganography.
All information-theoretic formulations of steganography are severely limited, however, be-
cause it is easy to show that information-theoretically secure steganography implies information-
theoretically secure encryption; thus any secure stegosystem with N bits of secret key can
encode at most N hidden bits. In addition, techniques such as public-key steganography
and robust steganography are information-theoretically impossible.
3
4 Contributions of the thesis
The primary contribution of this thesis is a rigorous, cryptographic theory of steganography.
The results which establish this theory fall under several categories: symmetric-key steganog-
raphy, public-key steganography, steganography with active adversaries, steganographic rate,
and steganographic computation. Here we summarize the results in each category.
Symmetric Key Steganography.
Symmetric-key steganography is the most basic setting for steganography: Alice and Bob
possess a shared secret key and would like to use it to exchange hidden messages over a public
channel so that Ward cannot detect the presence of these messages. Despite the apparent
simplicity of this scenario, there has been little work on giving a precise formulation of
steganographic security. Our goal is to give such a formal description.
We first give definitions dealing with the correctness and security of symmetric-key
steganography, in terms of indistinguishability from a probabilistic channel process C which
models communication as a sequence of documents drawn from a set D. Then we show that
these notions are feasible by giving constructions which satisfy them, under the assumption
that pseudorandom function families exist. Finally, we explore the necessary conditions for
the existence of secure symmetric-key steganography. We show that secure stegosystems
relative to a channel exist only if one-way functions exist relative to the channel, and that
the existence of a secure stegosystem for a channel implies that the channel is efficiently
sampleable.
Public-Key Steganography
Symmetric-key steganograph assumes that the sender and receiver share a secret, randomly
chosen key. In the case that some exchange of key material was possible before the use of
steganography was necessary, this may be a reasonable assumption. In the more general
case, two parties may wish to communicate steganographically, without prior agreement
on a secret key. We call such communication public key steganography. Whereas previous
work has shown that symmetric-key steganography is possible – though inefficient – in an
information-theoretic model, public steganography is information-theoretically impossible.
Thus our complexity-theoretic formulation of steganographic secrecy is crucial to the question
of public-key stegangoraphy.
We first introduce some required basic primitives from the theory of public-key cryptogra-
phy, including the nonstandard notion of a public-key cryptosystem that is indistinguishable
from random bits. We then give definitions for public-key steganography and show how to
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use these primitives to construct a public-key stegosystem. Finally, we introduce the notion
of steganographic key exchange, in which two parties have an innocent looking conversation
and at the end, can agree on a key that looks random to any external observer, and give a
construction which is secure under the Integer Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Steganography with active adversaries
The previously described results show that a passive adversary (one who simply eavesdrops
on the communications between Alice and Bob) cannot hope to subvert the operation of a
stegosystem. In this chapter, we consider the notion of an active adversary who is allowed to
introduce new messages into the communications channel between Alice and Bob. In such a
situation, an adversary could have two different goals: disruption or detection.
Disrupting adversaries attempt to prevent Alice and Bob from communicating stegano-
graphically, subject to some set of publicly-known restrictions. We call a stegosystem which
is secure against this type of attack robust. We will give a formal definition of robustness
against such an attack, consider what type of restrictions on an adversary are necessary for
the existence of a robust stegosystem, and give the first construction of a provably robust
stegosystem against any set of restrictions satisfying this necessary condition. Our protocol
is secure assuming the existence of pseudorandom functions.
Distinguishing adversaries introduce additional traffic between Alice and Bob in hopes
of tricking them into revealing their use of steganography. We consider the security of
symmetric- and public-key stegosystems against active distinguishers, and give constructions
which are secure against various notions of active distinguishing attacks. In order to do so,
we introduce the notion of a cryptoystem which is indistinguishable from random bits under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, and exhibit symmetric-key and public-key cryptosystems
satisfying this notion.
We also show that no stegosystem can be simultaneously secure against both disrupting
and distinguishing active adversaries. This contradicts a conjecture that the two goals can
be addressed orthogonally, stated in a recent paper [7] which addresses the issue of active
distinguishing adversaries.
Bounds on steganographic rate
Intuitively, the rate of a stegosystem is the number of bits of hiddentext that a stegosystem
encodes per document of covertext. Clearly, for practical use a stegosystem should have a
relatively high rate, since it may be impractical to send many documents to encode just a few
bits. Thus an important question for steganography, first posed by Anderson and Petitcolas
[6] is “how much information can be safely encoded by a stegosystem in the channel C?”
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A trivial upper bound on the rate of a stegosystem is log |D|. Prior to our work, there
were no provably secure stegosystems, and so there was no known lower bound. The rate
of our previous constructions is o(1), that is, as the security parameter k goes to infinity,
the rate goes to 0. In this chapter, we will address the question of what the optimal rate
is for a (universal) stegosystem. We first formalize the definition of the rate of a universal
stegosystem. We will then tighten the trivial upper bound by giving a rate MAX such
that any universal stegosystem with rate exceeding MAX is insecure. We will then give a
matching lower bound by exhibiting a provably secure stegosystem with rate (1−o(1))MAX.
Finally we will address the question of what rate a robust stegosystem may achieve: we give
an upper bound RMAX above which a universally robust stegosystem is insecure, and a
construction with rate (1− ε)RMAX for any ε > 0.
Covert Computation
We introduce the novel concept of covert two-party computation. Whereas ordinary secure
two-party computation only guarantees that no more knowledge is leaked about the inputs
of the individual parties than the result of the computation, covert two-party computation
employs steganography to yield the following additional guarantees: (A) no outside eaves-
dropper can determine whether the two parties are performing the computation or simply
communicating as they normally do; (B) before learning f(xA, xB), neither party can tell
whether the other is running the protocol; (C) after the protocol concludes, each party can
only determine if the other ran the protocol insofar as they can distinguish f(xA, xB) from
uniformly chosen random bits. Covert two-party computation thus allows the construction of
protocols that return f(xA, xB) only when it equals a certain value of interest (such as “Yes,
we are romantically interested in each other”) but for which neither party can determine
whether the other even ran the protocol whenever f(xA, xB) does not equal the value of in-
terest. We introduce security definitions for covert two-party computation and we construct
protocols with provable security based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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[15] E. Brickell, D. Chaum, I. Damgärd, J. van de Graaf: Gradual and Verifiable Release of
a Secret. Advances in Cryptology – Proceedings of CRYPTO ’87, pages 156-166, 1987.
[16] C. Cachin. An Information-Theoretic Model for Steganography. In: Information Hiding
– Second International Workshop, Preproceedings. April 1998.
7
[17] C. Cachin. An Information-Theoretic Model for Steganography. In: Information and
Computation 192 (1): pages 41–56, July 2004.
[18] R. Canetti, U. Feige, O. Goldreich and M. Naor. Adaptively Secure Multi-party Com-
putation. 28th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 96), pages 639-648. 1996.
[19] R. Cramer and V. Shoup. A practical public-key cryptosystem provably secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 98, Springer LNCS
1462, pages 13-27, 1998.
[20] R. Cramer and V. Shoup. Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption. Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 2002,
Springer LNCS 2332, pages 45-64. 2002.
[21] S. Craver. On Public-Key Steganography in the Presence of an Active Warden. In:
Information Hiding – Second International Workshop, Preproceedings. April 1998.
[22] D. Dolev, C. Dwork, and M. Naor. Non-malleable Cryptography. 23rd Symposium on
Theory of Computing (STOC ’91), pages 542-552. 1991.
[23] Z. Galil, S. Haber, M. Yung. Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Proto-
cols and the Public-Key Model. Advances in Cryptology – Proceedings of CRYPTO ’87,
pages 135-155, 1987.
[24] O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools. Cambridge University Press,
2001.
[25] O. Goldreich. Secure Multi-Party Computation. Unpublished Manuscript.
http://philby.ucsd.edu/books.html, 1998.
[26] O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. How to construct pseudorandom functions.
Journal of the ACM, vol 33, 1998.
[27] O. Goldreich and L.A. Levin. A Hardcore predicate for all one-way functions. In:
Proceedings of 21st STOC, pages 25–32, 1989.
[28] O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Wigderson. How to Play any Mental Game. Nineteenth
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 218-229.
[29] S. Goldwasser and M. Bellare. Lecture Notes on Cryptography. Unpublished manuscript,
August 2001. available electronically at http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/pa
pers/gb.html.
8
[30] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic Encryption & how to play mental poker
keeping secret all partial information. In: Proceedings of the 14th STOC, pages 365–377,
1982.
[31] D. Gruhl, W. Bender, and A. Lu. Echo Hiding. In: Information Hiding: First Interna-
tional Workshop, pages 295–315, 1996.
[32] J. Hastad, R. Impagliazzo, L. Levin, and M. Luby. A pseudorandom generator from
any one-way function. SIAM Journal on Computing, 28(4), pages 1364-1396, 1999.
[33] N. Hopper, J. Langford and L. Von Ahn. Provably Secure Steganography. Advances in
Cryptology – Proceedings of CRYPTO ’02, pages 77-92, 2002.
[34] Nicholas J. Hopper, John Langford, and Luis von Ahn. Provably Secure Steganography.
CMU Tech Report CMU-CS-TR-02-149, 2002.
[35] Russell Impagliazzo and Michael Luby. One-way Functions are Essential for Complexity
Based Cryptography. In: 30th FOCS, November 1989.
[36] G. Jagpal. Steganography in Digital Images Thesis, Cambridge University Computer
Laboratory, May 1995.
[37] D. Kahn. The Code Breakers. Macmillan 1967.
[38] J. Katz and M. Yung. Complete characterization of security notions for probabilistic
private-key encryption. In: Proceedings of 32nd STOC, pages 245–254, 1999.
[39] Stefan Katzenbeisser and Fabien A. P. Petitcolas. Information hiding techniques for
steganography and digital watermarking. Artech House Books, 1999.
[40] Y. Lindell. A Simpler Construction of CCA2-Secure Public Key Encryption. Advances
in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT 2003, Springer LNCS 2656, pages 241-254. 2003.
[41] K. Matsui and K. Tanaka. Video-steganography. In: IMA Intellectual Property Project
Proceedings, volume 1, pages 187–206, 1994.
[42] T. Mittelholzer. An Information-Theoretic Approach to Steganography and Watermark-
ing In: Information Hiding – Third International Workshop. 2000.
[43] M. Naor and B. Pinkas. Efficient Oblivious Transfer Protocols. In: Proceedings of
the 12th Annual ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2001), pages
448–457. 2001.
9
[44] M. Naor, B. Pinkas and R. Sumner. Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism
Design. In: Proceedings, 1999 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
[45] M. Naor and M. Yung. Universal One-Way Hash Functions and their Cryptographic
Applications. 21st Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 89), pages 33-43. 1989.
[46] M. Naor and M. Yung. Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ci-
phertext attacks. 22nd Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 90), pages 427-437.
1990.
[47] C. Neubauer, J. Herre, and K. Brandenburg. Continuous Steganographic Data Trans-
mission Using Uncompressed Audio. In: Information Hiding: Second International Work-
shop, pages 208–217, 1998.
[48] B. Pinkas. Fair Secure Two-Party Computation. In: Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt
’03, pp 87–105, 2003.
[49] C. Rackoff and D. Simon. Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and
Chosen Ciphertext Attack. Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO 91, Springer LNCS 576,
pages 433-444, 1992.
[50] L. Reyzin and S. Russell. Simple Stateless Steganography. IACR e-print archive report
2003/093, 2003.
[51] Phillip Rogaway, Mihir Bellare, John Black and Ted Krovetz. OCB: A Block-Cipher
Mode of Operation for Efficient Authenticated Encryption. In: Proceedings of the Eight
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS-8). November 2001.
[52] J. Rompel. One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures. 22nd
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 90), pages 387-394. 1990.
[53] A. Sahai. Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Adaptive Chosen-
Ciphertext Security. 40th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
99), pages 543-553. 1999.
[54] J. A. O’Sullivan, P. Moulin, and J. M. Ettinger Information theoretic analysis of
Steganography. In: Proceedings ISIT ‘98. 1998.
[55] C.E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. In: Bell System Technical
Journal, 28 (1949), pages 656-715.
[56] G.J. Simmons. The Prisoner’s Problem and the Subliminal Channel. In: Proceedings of
CRYPTO ’83. 1984.
10
[57] L. Welch and E.R. Berlekamp. Error correction of algebraic block codes. US Patent
Number 4,663,470, December 1986.
[58] A. Westfeld, G. Wolf. Steganography in a Video Conferencing System. In: Information
Hiding – Second International Workshop, Preproceedings. April 1998.
[59] A. C. Yao. Protocols for Secure Computation. Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, 1982, pages 160–164.
[60] A. C. Yao. How to Generate and Exchange Secrets. Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Sym-
posium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1986, pages 162–167.
[61] A. Young and M. Yung. Kleptography: Using Cryptography against Cryptography.
Advances in Cryptology: Eurocrypt 87, Springer LNCS 1233, pages 62-74, 1987.
[62] J Zollner, H.Federrath, H.Klimant, A.Pftizmann, R. Piotraschke, A.Westfield, G.Wicke,
G.Wolf. Modeling the security of steganographic systems. In: Information Hiding – Second
International Workshop, Preproceedings. April 1998.
11
